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If life time is uncertain and if agents (consumers or workers) are risk averse, then annu-
ities are an appropriatetool. If the price is actually fair, consumers should investall their
wealth in annuity products. This intuitive and simple principle has been formalized by
Yaari (1965). From a theoretical point of view the issue seems clear. But empirically,
markets for annuities are really small and only few people choose to use them. For ex-
ample Friedman and Warshawsky(1990) indicatethat only two percent of the American
elderly population own individual annuities of any sort.
Market imperfections, and especially adverse selection, are commonly use to ex-
plain what seems to be a well established stylized fact. Following the Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976)’s analysis, If consumers have better knowledge of their own survival
probability than insurance compagnies, annuities cannot be fairly priced and the aggre-
gated outcome is not Pareto-efﬁcient.
Thepresence ofadverseselectionintheannuitymarketshas been empiricallytested.
Chiappori and Salanié (2002) note that evidences of adverse selection has been repeat-
edly found in the literature. Warshawsky (1988) computes the value of an annuity by
using the mortality probabilities of the general population and mortality probabilities
of the annuities purchasers. He interprets the difference between these two values as
the cost of adverse selection and concludes that adverse selection is signiﬁcant. Fried-
man and Warshawsky (1990) show that there is a substantial difference between the
survival probability of the general population and the survival probability of the annuity
purchasers which conﬁrm the Warshawsky (1988)’s previous results.
More recently, Finkelstein and Porteba (2002) and Finkelstein and Porteba (2004)
use English datas to measure the importance of adverse selection. In the ﬁrst paper
explores adverse selection in the voluntary and compulsory individual annuity markets
in the United Kingdom. They ﬁnd that annuitants are longer-lived than non-annuitants.
These mortality differences are more pronounced in the voluntary than in the compul-
sory annuity market. They estimate that the amount of adverse selection in the compul-
sory market is about one half of that in the voluntary market.
In their second paper, using the same data set, they also ﬁnd systematicrelationships
between ex post mortality and annuities’ characteristics, such as the timing of payments
1and the possibility of payments to the annuitant’s estate. However, they ﬁnd no evi-
dence of substantive mortality differences by annuity size. These results suggest that
the absence of selection on one contract dimension does not preclude its presence on
others.
All the latter contributions rely on the Rothschild and Stiglitz’s (1976) insurance
model (RS hereafter). First, this model is not explicitly a model of annuity market, and
hence it does not introduce explicitly mortality probabilities or or retirement scheme.
Second, the RS’s model assume explicitly that insurance contracts are “exclusive”. An
agent cannot hold simultaneouslytwo or more contracts. These assumptionsare crucial,
for the economic methodology and for the equilibrium allocation properties.
Concerning the ﬁrst limit of RS, we will not introduce a more explicit model. The
literature considers generally as precise enough. Exclusivity is not a good assumption
when we consider annuity markets (see Filkenstein and Porteba, 2004 for example). We
construct a model of insurance with adverse selection in the spirit of Rothschild and
Stiglitz (1976) but we allow for non-exclusive contracts.
Non exclusivity has been studied in insurance theory. Kahn and Mookherjee (1998)
study the consequences of moral hazard in this setting. But their model is quite different
from our, not only because they consider another kind of asymmetric information. They
adopt a very unusual timing: the agent (the insure) plays ﬁrst, he receives sequentially
offers from different insurance companies and selects his favorite offers. In this paper
will keep the traditional timing, insurances offers simultaneouslyone or more contracts.
The agents observe the offers and select their favorite ones.
Bisin and Guaitoli (2004) consider a model of non-exclusive insurance affected by
moral hazard in a timing similar to ours. Hence it is an interesting reference point has
the main difference between our paper and their is the kind of market imperfection that
we consider. Their consider Moral Hazard, we consider adverse selection. Except that,
our models are quite comparable.
Our ﬁrst ﬁnding is that at equilibrium, competitiveinsurance companies do not offer
“linear contracts”. By linear contracts, we mean contracts such that the premium is
linear function of the repayment. Technically, this ﬁrst result does not depend on the
2restriction that we can make on communication scheme, it means that it a very general
feature of the model.
Surprisingly, in the literature it is often argued that non-exclusivity leads to equlib-
ria in which only linear contracts are offered. Chiappori (2000) claims that with non-
exclusivity agents can always linearize the schedule by buying a large number of small
contracts from different insurers. It is true if insurers are offering small contracts, which
not the case at equilibrium. We show that at equilibrium insurance companies have no
incentive to offer small contract and hence the equilibrium contracts are not linear.
Then, we characterize an equilibrium which has several interesting properties. It
is different from the equilibrium characterized by RS. There is a cross-subsidization
between the agents. High risk agent are fully insured, and the low risk agents are not
fully insured as in the RS’s model. Finally, we show that this equilibrium is efﬁcient.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we state the model. Then in section
3, we present our ﬁrst the result, the impossibility of linear equilibrium. In section 4 we
characterize and analyze an equilibrium of our model. Finally in section 5 we conclude.
2 The model
The agents have all the same preferences, represented by a vNM utility function U(.).
Each agent can enjoy a “short” or a “long” life, with some probabilities. We keep a
very stylized model of of insurance and consider that the utility of the agent can be
represented as:
pU (w− p−l+r)+(1−p)U (w− p), (1)
where w is the exogenous income of the agent, p is the net price of the annuity, l is the
extra cost induce by a longer life and r represents the extra annuities that the agent get
if he lives long life. The probability of living longer is denoted p. The utility can also
be interpreted as a traditional insurance problem, p is the probability of accident, l the
losses generated by and accident, p the insurance premium and r is the repayment. We
call the couple (p,r) a contract. For convenience, it will be sometime denotedC.
3To simplify the notation, we will use a short notation for the utility function
∀(p,r) ∈R2
+, ∀p ∈[0,1] V ((p,r),p)=pU (w− p−l +r)+(1−p)U (w− p). (2)
We consider markets, agents will be taken as “small” players. Hence they will play
independently and they will not interact in any way. Our model can be interpreted as
well as a model with a single agent.
Insurance companies are formalized as proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms with the same con-
stant return-to-scale production technology. Namely, an annuity contract (p,r) owns by
agent having a probability p to live a long life, generates the proﬁt:
p−pr. (3)
We do not introduce any administrative cost. By doing this, we follow the RS’s model
and keep our results comparable to the RS’s ones. Moreover, administrative costs do
not seem to be important and cannot explain alone why annuity markets are empirically
so small. Porteba (2001) give some econometric evidence showing that administrative
costs can explain only a reduced share of annuities prices.1 As we have said, we do not
want to depart from traditional insurance model.
The main issue of the model is the adverse selection problem. Then, we introduced
two kind of agents, differing by their probability to livelonger. Some agents have a high
life expectancy, their probability to livea long life is p2 and some other have a lower life
expectancy, i.e; they have a probability p1 to live longer life (and by necessity p2 > p1).
The proportion of high and low life expectancy agents are respectively n2 and n1, and
n1+n2 = n.
Probabilities p2 and p1 and proportion n1 and n2 are common knowledge. Agents
know their life expectancy, insurance companies cannot distinguish between the two
kind of agents and cannot offer contract contingent on the their life expectancy.
Insurance company cannot prevent agents to buy contracts from other companies.
In that sense contracts are incomplete. Hence we consider a model of non-exclusive
contracts, or in the jargon of contract theory, a common agency game.
1Murthi, Orszag, and Orszag (1999) and Cannon and Tonks (2003) conﬁrm these results.
4If agent are allowed to hold simultaneously several contracts, market are not anony-
mous. They cannot buy to contracts to the same company, and they cannot resell their
contract to some other agent.
To make the problem tractable, we assume that the agents’ preferences satisfy the
“single crossing” condition. The restriction is critical and it is know that properties
derived under this assumption are sometimes not robust. Formally:







Graphically, in the space (r,p), if two indifference curves cross each others, they cross
only once.











Figure 1: Single Crossing Property
In the ﬁgure 1, two indifference curves intersect at the point C. The indifference
curve of the high probability agents (denoted IC2) has always a higher derivative than
the indifference curve of the low probability agents (denoted IC1). Hence they cannot
intersect twice.
We follow the literature on common agency games and we consider that insurance
companies (the principals) compete through “menus” (generically denoted M in the
following.) In other words, we will consider that insurance companies offer a set of
6contract, and the agent is allow to choose one in each of these sets. Peters (2001) and
Martimortand Stole (2002)haveshown that there is no lossof generality by considering
these kind of mechanisms. Hence our results do not rely on any ad hoc restriction on
the offers that can be made by the insurers.2 For obvious technical reasons, we will
constrain these sets M to be compact and measurable.
To be precise we give the deﬁnition of a linear equilibrium.
Deﬁnition 1 We said that an equilibrium is linear if:
• The insurance companies offer the same menu,
• this menu is a line in the space (p,r).
In other words, an equilibrium is linear if the equilibrium price is linear.




2 . The both type of agents receive a fair insurance
contract with respect to their probability: CFB
1 belongs to the line L1, characterized by
the equation p = p1r, the contractCFB
2 belong to L2, (equation p =p2r). They are fully
insured. The equilibrium is efﬁcient.
2Let us remark that we do not allow for random mechanisms. In our model insurers cannot offer
lotteries over contracts. We do not think that random mechanisms are realistic: to be implemented,
insurance companies should be able to commit on random variable. Nevertheless, this restriction is not
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Figure 2: The competitive equilibrium under full information
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Figure 3: The Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium
We denote CRS
1 and CRS
2 the equilibrium contracts. The high probability agents re-
ceive their competitive outcome: CRS
2 =CFB
2 . Hence they fully insured. The low prob-
ability agents receive the contract cRS
1 which is deﬁned has the intersection of the line
L1 and the indifference curve of the high probability agents passing through CFB
2 (here
denoted IC2). The low probability agent are not fully insured. The equilibrium exists
9if the proportion of high probability agents n2 is large enough. This equilibrium (when
it exists) is not efﬁcient, even if we consider the constraints due to information. An
imperfectly informed planner could improve the allocation.
3 Linear Prices
We consider a scenario in which n insurance companies (n > 1) interact by offering lin-
ear contracts. By linear contracts, we mean that they offer menus in which the premium




+|p = ar, with a ∈ [0,1]
 
. (5)
We will show that if n−1 ﬁrms are offering the linear contract Ma, the nth has no
incentive to offer that contract.
In order to do that, let us assume that at equilibrium each insurance company offers
a contract such that the premium p is proportional to the indemnity r. In that case, agent
with the probability of accident p, (with p ∈ {p1,p2}) who has chosen a contract (ar,r)
gets the utility:
pU (w−ar−l+r)+(1−p)U (w−ar). (6)
Let us remark that choosing a contract for an agent, is equivalent to choose a partic-
ular r. For the agent contracting with only one company or accepting several contract
from different companies is equivalent.
Let us denote the contract chosen by the agent p:
[r∗(a,p);p∗(a,p) = ar∗(a,p)] (7)
If a ≤ p then r∗(a,p) = l, and if a > p then r∗(a,p) < l. Moreover, for every a ∈
(p1,p2] we have r∗(a,p1) < r∗(a,p2) ≥ l. To simplify the notations, we deﬁne P(a)
as
P(a) = n1[ar∗(a,p1)−p1r∗(a,p1)]+n2[ar∗(a,p2)−p2r∗(a,p2)]. (8)
10Lemma 1 Let us consider a linear symmetric equilibrium in which each company offer
the menu of contract Ma where a ∈ (0,p2). Then it exists a contract ( ˜ p, ˜ r) ∈ R2
+ such
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If the Menu Ma is offered, low risk agent buy the contract C1 and high risk agents
buy the contract C2 as indicated in the graph. It would be better or a principal to con-
12strain the high risk agents to buy the contract C1. This can be (almost) done if he offers
the single contract ˜ C. The low risk agents prefer this new contract. The high agents to.
They by it and they supplement it in order to get the contact C. If ˜ C is close enough to
C1, the deviation is proﬁtable. This is formally stated in our ﬁrst proposition.
Proposition 1 If the single crossing condition is satisﬁed, at equilibrium, insurance
companies are offering linear contracts.
Let us interpret a little bit more this ﬁrst proposition. It is show that if all other
companies offer the same linear menu Ma, the best reply of a company is to offer some-
thing else. But it has stronger implications. Imagine that the offers made by the (n−1)
companies lead to an aggregate menu equal to Ma. This can happen if they are inﬁnitely
many companies that offer each a single contract which belongs to the line deﬁned by
p = ar. Then the best reply of the remain company is to offer a contract or a set of
contract which is not in the line deﬁned by p = ar.
Our result does not rely on the number of company n (as long as n > 1). Hence even
if n is very large, in other words, even if the market is very competitive, we should not
observe linear prices.
If the single crossing condition is not satisﬁed, it may exist a linear equilibrium.3
Concerning our model, even if we do not have a formal proof, the existence of a linear
equilibrium would be very surprising, locally the the same kind of argument can be
applied.
4 Nonlinear Prices
In the previous section we have shown that at equilibrium menus are not linear. Hence
it is legitimate to try to characterize nonlinear equilibria. One natural candidate for an
equilibrium is the RS equilibrium. In fact it turns out that the RS equilibrium is not
implement anymore if insurance companies cannot impose an exclusive relationship to
the agent.
Proposition 2 The RS equilibrium is never implementable under non-exclusivity.
3Under exclusivity, Chassagnon and Chiappori (1997) show that insurance competition that the RS
equilibrium is modiﬁed, even if some of its predictions remain valid.
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Figure 4: The Rothschild-Stiglitz equilibrium is not robust
In the example presented in the graphic, if all other insurance companies offer the
RS contracts, a insurance company can offer the contract C3. As shown in the graphic
the contract C3 generates positive proﬁt if it bough by the high risk agents as it is above
14the line L2. The graphic also shows that this contract is never bough alone by a high risk
agent, it is above the curve IC2. But the high risk agents can buy the contractC1 and the
contract C3 together, then they reach the point ˜ C which is strictly preferred to the point
CRS
2 . Hence, the deviation is proﬁtable for the deviating principal.
The RS equilibrium is not implementable because an insurance company can use
the contract offered by its competitors as bases for its own offers. Roughly speaking an
insurance company can ask to a high risk agent to misreport his type to an other com-
pany. He will enjoy a cheap contract, but with a low coverage. The deviating company
then propose to him to supplement this contract with a small contract. The resulting
contract, will remains relatively cheap, but with a acceptable coverage. Obviously, this
deviation implies losses for the non-deviating companies.
Under non-exclusivity,insurancecompanies mustpreventthiskind ofdeviation, and
hence they cannot propose anymore the RS contracts.
Let us consider the following contracts.
• Firstwedeﬁnethecontract ˜ C1 =( ˜ p1, ˜ r1)asthecontractthatmaximizesV (p1,r1,p1)
over (p1,r1) ∈ R2
+ under the constraint p1 = (n1p1+n2p2)r1.
• Second we deﬁne the contract ˜ C2 = ( ˜ p2, ˜ r2) in the following way. The coverage
r2 is such that r1+r2 = l and ˜ p2/˜ r2 = p2.
• Finally, we deﬁne ˆ C = ( ˆ p, ˆ r). The contract ˆ C is such that V( ˜ C2,p2) = V( ˜ C1 +
ˆ C,p2).





. We need to deﬁne few more contracts, that are convenient to
characterize our equilibrium but which are not offered at equilibrium.
• The contract C1 = (p1,r1) is deﬁned in the following way. It is a contract that
satisﬁed the three following conditions: V






, p2 = p1r2, ˜ r1 <
l.
• The contractC2 =(p2,r2) is deﬁned in a similar way. It is a contract that satisﬁed
the three following conditions: V






, p1 = p1r1, ˜ r1 < l.
15• The contract ˇ C1 = ( ˇ p1, ˇ r1) is deﬁned as ˇ C1 =C1+ ˆ C.
• Finally, ˇ C2 =C2+ ˆ C.
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Figure 5: The new contracts
The line L is the line having the equation p = (n1p1+n2p2) r.
We need conditions to characterize our equilibrium.
17Condition 1 The condition (E) is satisﬁed is and only if
• V







• 2 ˆ C < ˜ C1,
These two conditions ensure that the high risk agents will prefer the contracts designed
for them (the contract ˜ C1+ ˜ C2) rather than the contract than a contract that would result
from the duplication of the other existing contracts. In ﬁgure 5 the condition 2 ˆ C < ˜ C1
is not satisﬁed while the other condition is.
Condition 2 The condition (E′) is satisﬁed is and only if for all contracts C = (p,r) ∈
R2
+ suchthatV (C,p1)=V
  ˜ C1,p1
 
and p≥p1r,wehaveV







These conditions are needed to be sure that if an insurance deviates from the contract
˜ C1 and offer a contractC then the high risk agent will by it together with the contract ˆ C.
As we will see, it will make the deviation non proﬁtable.
Proposition 3 If the condition (E) and (E′) are satisﬁed: Hence the following menus
constitute an equilibrium:
• n companies offer the menu






• 2 companies offer the menu






The agents buy the contract ˜ C2 if their type is p2 and the contract ˜ C1 when their type
is p1.
Before to state the conditions under which the equilibrium exists, we will make few
remarks.
At equilibrium the contract ˆ C is never bought, it is a “latent contract”.4 Even if
this contract is not bought, it plays a crucial role. If it is not offered, a principal can
proﬁtably deviate by offering a contract close to C1 bought by the low risk agents only.
This deviation is not possible because the high risk would by this contract together with
4The term latent contract has been ﬁrst introduced by Hellwig (1983).
18the contract ˆ C. Martimort and Stole (2002) analyse in detail the implications in term
of direct mechanisms and menus. It is because we need “latent contracts” at equilib-
rium that we cannot restrict attention to direct mechanisms and that we should con-






The high risk agents buy two contract. The equilibriumcan obviouslyrewritten with
anewcontractC2 = ˜ C1+ ˜ C2. Theimportantthingisthatriskagentscanbuythecontracts
˜ C1 and ˜ C2. Inthatinterpretationoftheequilibrium,wecan emphasisthatakindofcross-
subsidizationoccurs at equilibrium. The lowriskagents buythecontract ˜ C1 which isnot
actuarially fair given their probability p1. They buy a relatively expensive contract. On
the other hand, the high risk agents buy a relatively cheap contract, C2 or ˜ C1+ ˜ C2. This
contract is sustainable only because it is subsidized by the low risk agents. In the RS’s
model, the equilibrium contract are acturially fair and any kind of cross-subsidization
can be sustained at equilibrium.
Insurance companies do not make proﬁt at equilibrium. It is a surprising result
compared to one obtained by Bisin and Guaitoli (2004). As we have said, the main
difference between our model and their, is that we consider adverse selection and their
consider moral hazard. Contrary to us, they found positive proﬁt equilibria (for some
values of their parameters). These positive proﬁt equilibria are very strong, they are
robust to free entry.5
The intuition behind these very different results could be that in moral hazard model
a littlechange in the offers may induce very different behaviors. Agent who was making
effortsmay stopsuddenly. Henceinamoralhazard settingtheBertrand’s argumentdoes
not apply because a aggressive offer may change the agent’s behavior.
Here, agent takes no decisions, except to buy or not contracts. Hence an insurance
company can make aggressive offers provided that its offer remains incentive compati-
ble. It turns out that the only aggressive offers that an insurance can make are the ones
bought by all the agents. Hence at equilibrium insurances propose a contract that is
bought by all agent and leads to zero proﬁts.
5Positive proﬁt equilibria seems to be a common feature of common agency modal of moral hazard.
Parlour and Rajan (2001) in a model of strategic default show that at equilibrium proﬁts may be strictly
positive.
19This interpretation should be taken carefully. Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000)
proposed a model close to our and characterize positive proﬁt equilibria. Their model is
not a real model ofinsurance and it is interpreted as a modelof ﬁnance. Neverthelessthe
reason why their results are different from ours remains unclear. An explanation could
be that they consider a continuum of type and we consider only two types of agents. In
any case their model and our are quite different and cannot be compared directly.
At equilibrium, high risk agents are fully insured, low risk agent are only partially
covered. It justify the approach taken in applied papers. It is not a surprising result. Our
model can be interpreted as the RS’s model plus some extra constraints. Hence, it is
natural to ﬁnd that it exhibits the RS’s equilibrium main property.
Finally, the number of ﬁrms do not affect the equilibrium (as long as n ≥ 1). Hence
even if n becomes very large, the equilibrium does not converge toward a linear equi-
librium. Hence our model does not provide any foundation for a general equilibrium
approach of incomplete information models.6
Proposition 4 If p1 and p2 areclosed enough andis n1 is smallenough, theequilibrium
characterized in proposition 3 exists.
The existence conditions are different from RS. They need a sufﬁciently high pro-
portion ofhigh risk agents. We require exactly the reverse, a sufﬁcientlyhigh proportion
of low risk agents. Moreover they do not need any assumption one the probabilities p1
and p2. We need the restrictive condition p1 and p2 not to much different.
Hence the RS equilibrium and our equilibrium cannot be compared straightfor-
wardly. They are likely to exist for different values of the parameters.
Nevertheless, we can state a last important property of our equilibrium.
Proposition 5 The equilibrium characterized in proposition 3 sustains an optimal allo-
cation.
6Let us remarkthat Biais, Martimort, andRochet (2000)ﬁnd an allocationequilibriumwhichdepends
on n. But in their model, as in our, the limit equilibrium is not a linear equilibrium.
20The equilibrium allocation is different from the full information equilibrium de-
scribed in ﬁgure 2. As the utilities are not transferable, the optimal quantities are not
unique. Hence we can have two different allocations that are both optimal.
The equilibrium allocation is also ﬁrst best optimal. We mean that it would be
an optimal allocation in a full information economy. At a ﬁrst glance it sounds very
surprising. It is not. The information structure, here the fact that agents know their
probability of survival, constrains the set of optimal allocation. In other words some
optimal are not implementable because of information issues. For example, it is clear
the full informationcompetitiveequilibriumallocationis not sustainableanymoreunder
asymmetric information. If some optimal allocations are not implementable anymore,
some remain implementable, as it is the case for our equilibrium allocation. In general,
optimal allocations that give a lot of surplus to the high risk agents are likely to be
implementable under asymmetric information. As they enjoy an high level of welfare,
high risk agents have no reason to adopt a strategic behavior.
Our interpretation of this result is the following. First, let us remark that at equilib-
rium the risk agents are not indifferent between their contract ˜ C1+ ˜ C2 and the contract
designed for the low risk agents, ˜ C1. High risk agent prefer ˜ C1+ ˜ C2 than ˜ C1 and low risk
agent prefer ˜ C1 than ˜ C1+ ˜ C2. High risk agents have many way to cheat on the insurance
companies. They can choose one type contract from one company an another type of
contract from another company. In the RS’s model they can only choose the contract
designed for the low risk agents. As they have many way to misbehave, insurance com-
panies must let top them a lot of surplus. As they get a lot of surplus at equilibrium
they do not have reason to misbehave, i.e; to choose contracts not designed for them. It
follows that at equilibrium information is not an issue, and hence market forces lead to
an optimal allocation.
There is no standard results concerning optimality in common agency games. Bisin
and Guaitoli (2004) show that equilibria characterized in their moral hazard setting are
not efﬁcient. In the other hand, Attar, Campioni, and Piaser (2006) show that the equi-
libria of Parlour and Rajan’s (2001) common agency model are efﬁcient. In the same
manner the equilibrium characterized in Biais, Martimort, and Rochet (2000) is not
efﬁcient.
21Toconcludeourremarksaboutoptimality,wewouldemphasisthatiftheequilibrium
is efﬁcient, it may remain issues about redistribution. For example compared to RS
allocation, high risk agents prefer the non-exclusiveequilibrium, but the low risk agents
prefer the RS equilibrium, and insurance companies are indifferent.7 Then, even if it
is not efﬁcient, the RS equilibrium may be preferred to the non-exclusive outcome for
redistribution motives.
5 Conclusion
The literature on annuity markets focuses on equilibria in which prices are linear. In
this note, we have shown that there is no clear game theoretic foundations for that ap-
proach. More precisely, in a context of adverse selection, if insurance companies com-
pete through nonlinear prices, there is no equilibrium with linear price or converging
toward linear prices, even if the number of companies is very large.
As it appears that empirically prices seems to be linear, (see for example Finkelstein
and Porteba (2004)), we could conclude that adverse selection may not be relevant phe-
nomenon in annuity markets. It does not means that adverse selection is totally absent,
but other imperfections or features should be at work. Mainly we see two potential lines
of research:
Moral hazard may be a relevant aspect of annuity markets. Agents may have inﬂu-
ence on theirexpected litetime. If an agent knowsthat it willreceivea decent pensionin
his old days, he may change if behavior (alcohol, cigarettes) to enjoy a longer life. This
is a potentially important aspect of annuity markets which has not been fully explored
yet.
The positive correlation between life time and annuity could be explained by differ-
ent in wealth rather than by adverse selection effect as claimed by Attanasio and Hoynes
(2000). The potential importance of wealth distribution in retirement assets manage-
ment has been studied,8 but its policy implications are not been intensively studied.
7We should keep in mind that to make this comparison, the to equilibria must exist.
8For a survey see Webb (2004).
22Dushi and Webb (2004)’s ﬁndings suggest that wealth distribution is very important
factor that cannot be neglected.
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A Proof of Lemma 1
Let us consider the proﬁt P(a).
P(a) = n1[ar∗(a,p1)−p1r∗(a,p1)]+n2[ar∗(a,p2)−p2r∗(a,p2)]. (9)




The function P(a) is linearwith respect to thevariable r∗(a,p2), hence n1ar∗(a,p1)−
n1p1r∗(a,p1)+n2ar∗(a,p1)−n2p2r∗(a,p1) > P(a). By continuity, it exists a con-
tract ( ˜ p, ˜ r) as described in the statement of the lemma.
B Proof of Proposition 1
If there is a linear equilibrium characterized by ˜ a.
• If a ∈ [0,p1], companies make negative proﬁts. Hence it cannot be equilibrium
value.
• If a ∈ (p1,p2), lemma 1 implies that at least one company has a proﬁtable devi-
ation, the contract ˜ C. Even if the contract is bought by all agent, this contract if
more proﬁtable than the linear menu Ma.
23• If a ∈ [p2,1] hence P(a) > 0, and a standard argument applies: a ﬁrm can attract
all theagents by offeringa inﬁnitesimallyless proﬁtablelinearmenuMa−e, where
e > 0 and “very small”.
C Proof of Proposition 2




















































We consider the space (p,r) and the agents’ indifference curves in that space. At the































curve IC2, has derivative strictly greater than pFB
2 /rFB
2 . A insurance company can propose










The deviation is proﬁtable for the insurance company. Whoever buy the contract, it
makes positive and it bought with probability 1 by the p2-type agents.
D Proof of Proposition 3
D.1 Singleton









24First, if the contract C is bought by the p2-type agents only, it cannot be proﬁtable.
They buy the contracts ˜ C1 and ˜ C2, and those contracts would induces losses it they were
bought by p2-type agents only. Hence, all contracts that are preferred to ˜ C1+ ˜ C2 by the
p2-type agents induce loss for the insurance companies.
We assume that the contract C is bought by all agents. In order to be bought by
the p1-type agents, the contract C must be below the line deﬁne by the equation p =
(n1p1+n2p2)r. Hence, to be proﬁtable, it must be bought be the p1-type agents only.
To be bought by the p1-type agents only, the contract C must belong to the set

























This set has a simple graphical representation. We denote ˜ IC1 the indifference of the
p1-type agents passing through the contract ˜ C1, and We denote ˜ IC2 the indifference of
the p2-type agents passing through the contract ˜ C2. We denote by C∗ their intersection.
Under the basic assumption of our model, this intersection exists. Unambiguously
we can writeC∗ > ˜ C1, as the curve ˜ IC2 is tangent to a line passing through the point ˜ C1,
the curve ˜ IC1 and ˜ IC2 intersect at the right of ˜ C1. Moreover under the condition (E) we
haveC1 <C2. The set Z can be seen as the curviline triangleC∗C1C2.
Let us remark that under our assumptions, the set Z is nonempty.
Let us consider the contracts (p,r) of Z such that V ((p,r),p1) = V
  ˜ C1,p1
 
and
r ≤ ˜ r1. It is a segment of the curve ˜ IC1, that we denote ˜ S1.
The translation with respect to the vector ˆ C is denoted Tˆ C. We denote IC1 the trans-
late of ˜ IC1 by the translation Tˆ C. The translate of the segment ˜ S1 by the translation Tˆ C is
the segment overlineS1, from ˜ C1+ ˆ C1 to ˇ C1. We have assumed that C2 < ˇ C1.
Under our assumptions (condition (E′), the curve ˜ IC2 and the segment ˜ S1 cannot
intersect two times.
25From that discussion it comes that every point of the segment S1 is preferred to the
point ˜ C1+ ˜ C2 by the p2-type agents.
Now we consider the set of contract (p,r) such that:
p ≥ p1r,
V ((p,r),p1) ≥V




  ˜ C2,p2
 
,
p ≤ ˜ p1.
(12)
It is easy to check that this set (denote ˜ S2) is nonempty. Using simple arguments, it can






  ˜ C1+ ˜ C2,p2
 
. (13)
We deﬁne the set ˜ Z as
˜ Z =

    










   
p ≥ p1r,
V ((p,r),p1) ≥V




  ˜ C2,p2
 
,
p ≤ ˜ p1
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. (14)
We deﬁne the set ˇ Z as
˜ Z =

    
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,
p ≥ ˜ p1

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  ˜ C1+ ˜ C2,p2
 
. (15)
26To conclude, deviating toward a single contractC is never proﬁtable for a principal.
D.2 Two contracts menus
Let us assume that a principal deviates by offering a menu {C1,C1+C2}. To be prof-
itable, the preceding offer must be such that
V (C1,p1) ≥V












It implies that the contractC1 is below the line L. Moreover, the contractC2 must be the
line L2. It implies that the offer {C1,C1+C2} cannot be proﬁtable.
Any deviation involving two contracts that can be written as a menu {C1,C1+C2}
are not proﬁtable. Using the same kind or argument, one can see that there is no prof-
itable deviation by using menus of two contracts.
D.3 General Menus
Let us consider a menu M (compact subset of R2
+). As agent are “small”, the do not
interact (the game is similar to a game with one agent only), we can neglect mixed
strategies. We assume that p1-type agents choose the contractC1 and the p2-type agents
choose the contract C2. Hence rather than offer the menu M, the deviating principal
could equivalently offer the menu {C1,C2}. As we have seen, these deviations are not
proﬁtable.
E Proof of Proposition 4
First let us imagine that n = n1 and p1 < p2. Using continuity, we can state that that if
p1 are p2 closed enough, ˆ C is as small as we want. Moreover if n=n1, then ˜ C1 =C1 and
ˇ C1 = ˆ C+ ˜ C1. Hence by construction we have C1 <C2 < ˇ C1. Hence conditions (E) and
27(E′) are satisﬁed. Apply a simple argument of continuity, we can argue that it remains
true if n1 close enough to n.
F Proof of Proposition 5
If one want to increase p2-typeagents utility,it can only be doneby decreasing the proﬁt
of the insurance company. This due to the indifference curve passing through ˜ C2+ ˜ C1
has derivative equal to p2 at the point ˜ C2+ ˜ C1.
In order to get positive or zero proﬁts, insurance companies must charge the p1-type
agents, which decrease their utility.
The same argument applies to every other players (companies and p1-type agents).
28References
ATTANASIO, O. P., AND H. W. HOYNES (2000): “Differential Mortality and Wealth
Accumulation,” Journal of Human Resources, 35(1), 1–29.
ATTAR, A., E. CAMPIONI, AND G. PIASER (2006): “Multiple lending and constrained
efﬁciency in the credit market,” Contributions to Theoretical Economics, forthcom-
ing.
BIAIS, B., D. MARTIMORT, AND J.-C. ROCHET (2000): “Competing mechanisms in
a common value environment,” Econometrica, 78(4), 799–837.
BISIN, A., AND D. GUAITOLI (2004): “Moral hazard with non-exclusive contracts,”
Rand Journal of Economics, 35(2), 306–328.
CANNON, E., AND I. TONKS (2003): “The behaviour of UK annuity prices from 1972
to the present,” mimeo, University of Biristol.
CHASSAGNON, A., AND P.-A. CHIAPPORI (1997): “Insurance Under Moral Hazard
and Adverse Selection: The Case of Perfect Competition,” mimeo, DELTA.
CHIAPPORI, A. (2000): “Econometric models of insurance under asymmetric informa-
tion,” in Handbook of Insurance, ed. by G. Dionne. Elsevier.
CHIAPPORI, A., AND B. SALANIÉ (2002): “Testing contract theory: A survay of some
recent work,” CESifo Working Paper # 738.
DUSHI, I., AND A. WEBB (2004): “Rethinking the Sources of Adverse Selection in the
Annuity Market,” International Longevity Center, Unpublished Manuscript.
FINKELSTEIN, A., AND J. PORTEBA (2002): “Selection effects in the United Kingdom
individual annuities market,” The Economic Journal, 112, 28–50.
(2004): “Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: Policyholder evidence from
the U.K annuity market,” Journal of Political Ecnomy, 112(1), 183–208.
FRIEDMAN, B. M., AND M. J. WARSHAWSKY (1990): “The cost of annuities: Impli-
cations for saving behavior and bequests,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 105(1),
135–154.
29HELLWIG, M. (1983): “On Moral Hazard and Non-Price Equilibria in Competitive
Insurance Markets,” Discussion Paper No. 109, Sonderforschungsbereich 21, Bonn.
KAHN, C. M., AND D. MOOKHERJEE (1998): “Competition and Incentives with
Nonexclusive Contracts,” RAND Journal of Economics, 29(3), 443–465.
MARTIMORT, D., AND L. A. STOLE (2002): “The revelation and delegation principles
in common agency games,” Econometrica, 70(4), 1659–1673.
MURTHI, M., J. ORSZAG, AND P. R. ORSZAG (1999): “The Value for Money of Annu-
ities in the UK: Theory, Experience and Policy,” mimeo, Birkbeck College, London.
PARLOUR, C. A., AND U. RAJAN (2001): “Competition in Loan Contracts,” American
Economic Review, 91(5), 1311–1328.
PETERS, M. (2001): “Common Agency and the Revelation Principle,” Econometrica,
69(5), 1349–1372.
PORTEBA, J. M. (2001): “Annuity markets and retirement security,” Center for Retire-
ment Research at Boston College, Working Paper 2001-10.
ROTHSCHILD, M., AND J. STIGLITZ (1976): “Equilibrium in competitive insurance
markets: An essay on the economics of imperfect information,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, 90(4), 629–649.
WARSHAWSKY, M. (1988): “Private annuity markets in the United States: 1919-1984,”
Journal of Risk and Insurance, 55(3), 518–528.
WEBB, A. (2004): “Managing Retirement Assets,” International Longevity Center, Un-
published Manuscript.
YAARI, M. E. (1965): “Uncertain lifetime, Life insurance, and the theory of the con-
sumer,” Review of Economic Studies, 32(2), 137–150.
30